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[Sac. No. 6819.

In Bank.

Feb. 6,1959.]

HAROLD L. HOTLE et a1., as Executors, etc., Appellants, v.
EVELYN F. MILLER, as Special Administrator, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Reformation of Instruments-Pleading.-A complaint by exeeutors of a will alleging that on a designated date testatrix
and her husband opened a joint tenancy bank account, that
on another date more than 12 years later the spouses orally
agreed that, regardless of how title was held, all their property
had been acquired as community property and that "all of
said property, and any and all property which they might
therenfter acquire, should be held and owned by them as community property regardless of the way the reeord title might
stand at any time," that they employed an attorney to draft
the written instrument, which they executed in the mistaken
1.elief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding, but

McK. Dig. References: [1] Reformation of Instruments, § 35;
r2, 3, 6, 7, 9] Banks, § 85(1); [4] Evidence, § 327; [5] Evidence,
§ 381; [8] Husband and Wife, § 159.

[51 C.2d
that the attorney'. draft set forth a dc!ecth"e description of
the existing property and made, no reference to propedy
thereafter to be acquired, stated a cause of action for reforml\tion of the oral agreement on the ground of mutual mistllk!l
if such reformation would serve any interests of plaintiffs,
which it would if the oral agreement could affect the rights
of the parties in the joint aecount.
[2] Banks-Deposits-J'oint Tenancy or Ownership.-Former California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act 652),
in effect at the time a joint tenancy bank account was opened
between husband and wife, became a part of the contract of
the parties.
[3] ld.-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Under former
California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act
652), the making of a joint tenancy bank deposit was eonelusive evidence of the intention of the depositors at that
time to vest title in the survivor, but the statute did not
compel depositors thereafter to remain frozen to that intention
and did not deprive thenl of their freedom of contract to make
subsequent agreements ehanging their interests in the account.
[4] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence.-The parol evidence rule comes
into operation when there is a single and final memorial of
the understanding of the parties; when that takes place,
prior and contemporaneous negotiations, oral or written, are
excluded.
[5] ld.-Extrinsic Evidence-Subsequent Agreements.-The parol
evidence rule has no power to preclude future negotiations.
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged
or modified by subsequent agreement of the parties.
[6] Banks-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Even if forUler California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
652) were interpreted to deprive the depositors of a joint
tenancy bank account of their freedom to make subsequent
contracts changing their rights in the joint account, there
could be no such deprivation following the repeal of that
section in 1949. Financial Code, § 852, based thereon, not only
omits the provision making the form of deposit conclusive
evidence of the intent of the parties to vest title in the
survivor, but expressly recognizes that the deposit agreement
may not accurately reflect the interests of the depositors in the
account.
[7] Id.-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Although the
repealed provision of California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's
[2] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Banks, § 107 et seq.; Am.Jur., Banks,
§§ 425, 435.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 255; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1091.
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Gen. Laws, Act 652) was pnrt of n joint deposit agreemE'nt
entered into hy hUf;hann :md "'ife while it was in efl'l'ct, sinl'c
its repeal :\11,'1" rl'litrietion it llIig-ht thl'l'ctofore hnve impo!'l'd
on the d<'po!Oiton;' power to contrnct could survivc only by
'Virtue of its continued existence liS pal't of the contract of the
pnl'til's, who could not, llOWeyer, contrnct away their powcr
to conil'nct in thc future, since the law, not privnte agreement,
uetermines the essential elements of n vnlid contract.
[8] Husband and Wife-Changing Character of Property by
Agreement,.-A husband and wife may change the charactE'r
of their property by agreement.
,[9] Banks-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Implicit in
un oral agreement between husband and wife to change the
nnture of their iuterests in n joint bank deposit, entered into
subsequent to repeal of California Bank Act,' § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 652), relating to joint deposits, was the
mutual aDrogation by the parties of any conflicting provision
in their joint tenancy agreement. Their abrogation was effective, since they were free to contract at that t.ime wit.hout
regard to any limitations imposed by the repealed provision.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma Couuty. Hilliard Comst.ock, Judge. Reversed.
Action for reformation of a written agret'mellt. Judgment
for defendant entered on sustaining a general demurrer to
nrst amended complaint without leave to amend, l·eversed.
Donald M. Scott and Lounibos & Lounibos for Appellants.
Leon J. Libeu and Frank W. Finn for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, execut.ors of the will of Seymour Frizclle, appeal from a judgment for defendant, special
administrator of the estate of Jennie Frizelle, in an action
for reformation of a written agreement executed in January,
1953. The judgment was entered upon the sustaining of a
general demurrer to the ,nrst amended complaint 'without
leave to amend.
The complaint alleged:
On November 6, 1940, Seymour and Jennie opened an
account with the Bank of Sonoma. The deposit agreement
provided that "We hereby agree with each other and the
bank, that all moneys J10W or hereafter deposited by us or
either of us with the bank in this account shall be so drposited
[8] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Community Propel·ty, §§ 18, 46, 56, 58; Am.
Jur., HllSl)::ntl amI Wifc, §§ 281,302.
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and shall be received and held by the bank with the understanding and upon the conditions that said money as deposited,
without consideration of its previous ownership, and all
. interest therein (if any there be) shall be the property of
both of us as joint tenants and shall be payable to and col. lectable by either of us during our joint lives, and after death
of OIie of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the
surviTor, and shall be payable to and collectable by such
survivor. "
In January, 1953, Seymour and Jennie orally agreed that
regardless of how title was held, all of their property had been
acquired as their community property, that" all of said property, aud any and all property which they might thereafter
acquire, should be held and owned by them as community
property regardless of the way the record title might stand
at any time," and that they would execute a written agreement so providing. They employed an attorney to draft the
written agreement, which they executed in the mistaken
belief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding.
The attorney's draft, however, set forth a defective description of the existing property and made no reference to property thereafter to be acquired.
On October 20, 1954, Seymour executed a will in which he
undertook to dispose of all of the community property, and
Jennie executed a waiver of claim to her share of the community property in view of her election to accept the terms
of the will.
Seymour died on March 2, 1955. The balance in the bank
account was then $42,357.14. Jennie died on July 17, 1955.
Plaintiffs contend that they have stated a cause of action
for reformation of the 1953 agreement, that under the agreement as reformed the balance of the account is community
property, and that they are therefore entitled to administer
it as such pursuant to the terms of the will and Jennie's
waiver. Defendant contends, on the other hand, that whether
reformed or not the agreement cannot operate to change the
rights of the parties in the joint tenancy bank ftccount, that
title to it therefore vested in Jennie when she survived Seymour, and that since there is no allegation that any other
property is affected by the agreement, its reformation would
serve no purpose.
[1] The complaint states a cause of action for reformation
of the 1953 agreement on the ground of mutual mistake (Civ.
Code, § 3399; Murphy v. Rooney, 45 Cal. 78; Oatman v. Nie-
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meyer, 207 Cal. 424, 425·427 [278 r. 1043]; see Bailat'd v.
Marden, 36 Ca1.2d 703, 708 L237 P.2d 10]) if such reformation would serve any interest of plaintiffs. (A.1tCrbach v.
Healy, 174 Cal. 60, 63 [161 P. 1157].) It would if the 1953
agreement eould affect the rights of the parties in the joint
account.
[2] Defendant invokes former section 15a of the California Bank Aet (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Aet 652,
pp. 221-222), in effect at the time the joint account was opened,
to establjsh that the 1953 agreement cannot operate to defeat
Jennie's right of survivorship. That section provided in part:
"When a deposit shall be made in any bank by any person
or persons whether minor or adult in the names of such
depositor or depositors and another person or persons, and
in form to be paid to any of them or the survivor or survivors
of them, such deposit and any additions thereto made by any
such persons after the making thel·eof, shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants, and the deposit together
with all dividends or interest thereon, shall be held for the
exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to any of
them during their lifetime or to the survivor or survivors after
the death of one or more of them, and such payment and the
receipt or acquittance of the perSOll or persons to whom such
payment is made shall be valid and sufficient release nnd discharge to such bank for aU payments made on account of such
deposit prior to the receipt by such bank of notice in writing
not to pay such deposit in accordance with the terms thereof.
The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence
of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive t.t.'idence, in any
action or proceeding to which either such bank ortke surviving depositor or depositors may be a party, of the intention
of such depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such sllrvivor 01· survivors." (Italics added.)
Since this section was in effect at the time the account was
opened, it became a part of the contract of the parties. (Comastri v. Burke, 137 Ca1.App.2d 430, 434 [290 P.2d 663].)
Defendant aceordin~ly contends that in the absence of fraud
or undue influence, plaintiffs cannot now show that the parties
did not intend that title should vest in the survivo~.
[3] There is no doubt that under the statute the making
of the deposit is conclusiye evidence of the intention of the
depositors at that time to vest titlc in the survivor. It does
not follow, llOwever, that the statute compels depositc)rs there111 C.Zd-18
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after to remain frozen to that intention. It in no way
deprives the depo~jtors of tlleir freedom or eontract to make
subsequcnt agreements changing their intt~r(>.sts in the account. Such freedom is expressly recognized in Civil Code,
section 1698, which provides that a " contract in writing may
be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral
agreement, and not otherwise." Section 15a cannot reasonably be interpreted to impair this freedom to alter one eontract
by another. There is nothing in its language that would
ju!';tify such interpretation. The intention to which it refers
i:i the intention manifested by the making of the deposit in
the specified form and thus necessarily the intention existing
at the time that form is used. Its eonstrained language cannot be enlarged to nullify any subsequent contracts between
the depositors and thereby to repeal by implication Civil Code,
section 1698.
[4] This interpretation of section 15a in no way departs
from the parol evidence rule. "Extrinsic evidence is excluded because it eannot serve to pro,'e what the agreement
was, this being determined as a matter of law to be the
writing itself. The rule comes into operation when there is a
single and final memorial of the understauding of the parties.
When that takes place, prior and contemporaneous negotiations, oral or written, are excluded; or, as it is sometimes
said, the written memorial supersedes these prior or contemporaneous negotiations." (Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal.2d
255,265 [100 P.2d 1055].) [5] Obviously, however, it has
no corresponding power to preclude future negotiations .•• Any
contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or
modified by subsequent agreement of the parties. No contract whether oral or written can be varied, contradicted, or
discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may control
the effect of what happened yesterday; but what happened
yesterday cannot change the effect of what happens today.
This, it is believed, is the substance of what has been unfortunately called the 'parol evidence rule.'" (3 Corbin on
Contracts, § 574, pp. 222-223; s(>e also ,3 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.], § 632, p. 1817; McKeon v. Gi'U.~to, 44 Ca1.2d
]52, ]56-]57 [280 P.2d 782], and cases cited.) Paterson v.
OOlll4Stri, 39 Ca1.2d 66 [244 P.2d 902], Me(leit·os v. Cotia,
134 Cal.App.2d 452 [286 P.2d 546], Comastri v. Burke, 137
Cal.App.2d 430 [290 P.2d 663], and other cases interpreting
section 15a of the Bank Act are not to the contrary, for none
of them involved a subsequent agreement changing the rigllll\
or the dE'positors in a joint account.
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[6] Even if section 15a were interpreted to deprive the
<1epositors of their freedom to make subsl'qucnt contracts
changing their rights in thc joiut account there could be no
such deprivation following thc repeal of that section ill 1949.
Sl'dioll 832 of the Pinaneial Code bascd thereon not only
omits the provision making the form of the deposit conclusive
evidence of the intent of the parties to vest title in the survivor, but expressly recognizes that the deposit agreement may
not accurately reflect the interests of the depositors in the
account. It provides that the bank may refuse payment after
notice from a depositor "not to permit withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the account. _ . _ After receipt of
such notice, a bank may refuse, without liability, to honor
any check, rceeipt, or withdrawal order on the account pending determination of the rights of the parties."
[7] Although the repealed provision of section 15a was a
part of the joint deposit agreement entered into while it was
in effect, since its repeal, any restriction it might theretofore
llave imposed on the depositors' power to contract, could
survive only by virtue of its continued existence as part of
the contract of the parties. The parties could not, however, contract away their power to contract in the future, for
the law, 110t private agreement, determines the essential elements of a valid contract. (See 6 Corbin on Contracts, § 1293,
pp. 158-161.) [8] A husband and wife may change the
character of their property by agreement. (Civ. Code, § 158 ;
Estate 0/ WieUng, 37 Ca1.2d 106, 108 [230 P.2d 808].)
[9] Clearly implicit in the 1953 agreement in this case was
the mutual abrogation by the parties of any conflicting provision in their joint tenancy agreement. Their abrogation
was effective, since they were free to contract in 1953 without
regard to any limitations imposed by the repealed provision.
Ehrman v. Ro.~enthal, 117 Cal. 491 [49 P. 460], and It'ifts
v. Mission 1I ealth etc. Shop, 58 Ca1.App. 362 [208 P. 691],
cited by defendant are not to. the contrary. Tllose eases correctly bold that two parties to a tripartite agreement canllot
(']lange it to the prejudice of the third party. In the present
case the bank will in no way be prejudiced by recognizing its
depositors' subsequent agreement between themselves.
'l'he judgment is reversed.

Gibsoll, C ..T., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McComb, J., dissented.
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